Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 027871
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

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DRAFTED BY: AF:RJTIERNEY
APPROVED BY: AF:AMB. SCHAUFELE JR
S/S:AWOTTO
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O 080247Z FEB 77 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 027871

NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG-LAGOS

FOLLOWING REPEAT MAPUTO 118 ACTION SECSTATE DTD 07 FEB

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S E C R E T MAPUTO 0118

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DEPT PLEASE PASS LONDON, USMISSION USUN NEW YORK DAR ES
SALAAM PRETORIA CAPE TOWN LUSAKA (DAR ES SALAAM FOR AMB YOUNG

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, RH
SUBJECT: SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON RHODESIA
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PAGE 02 STATE 027871

REF: LONDON 1792 REPEATED STATE 23144

1. SUMMARY: EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT MANY OF THE ZIM-
BABWEAN GUERRILLAS WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT IF MUGABE OR
ZIPA ARE EXCLUDED FROM FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS OR IF THEY
ARE DENIED A ROLE IN THE FORMATION OF AN INDEPENDENT

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ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT. IN EMBASSY'S JUDGMENT, U.S. INTERESTS ARE BETTER SERVED IF WE REFRAIN FROM TRYING TO ENGINEER A MODERATE NKOMO/MUZOREWA GOVER MENT AS PROPOSED BY EMBASSY LONDON, EVEN THOUGH FAILURE TO REACH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WILL ENTAIL FURTHER FIGHTING AND EVENTUAL VICTORY BY THE GUERRILLAS.
END SUMMARY

2. EMBASSY APPRECIATES RECEIVING EMBASSY LONDON'S THOUGHFUL ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL REGARDING RHODESIAN DEVELOPMENT, AND WELCOMES OPPORTUNITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO EXPLORATIONS OF POLICY OPTIONS.

WE CONCUR FOR MOST PART WITH THE REASONS CITED FOR BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS, BUT DISAGREE WITH A FUNDA-MENTAL ASSUMPTION UNDERLYING EMBASSY LONDON'S POLICY PROPOSAL, WHICH IN TURN LEADS US TO MAKE QUITE DIF-FERENT POLICY RECOMMENDATION FROM THAT PROPOSED IN REFTEL.

A. FIRST, IT EMBASSY'S OPINION THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO ZIMBABWEAN PROBLEM IS NOT POSSIBLE-EVEN ASSUMING A NKOMO/MUZOREWA COALITION COULD BE FORMED--IF THE MUGABE FORCES OR ZIPA ARE EXCLUDED FROM FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS OR IF THEY ARE DENIED A ROLE IN THE FORMATION OF AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NEITHER THE PATRIOTIC FRONT NOR

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ZIPA IS A COHESIVE BODY: THEY ARE AS DIVIDED ON TRIBAL AND REGIONAL LINES AND AS RENT WITH PERSONAL RIVALRIES

AS ARE THE OTHER ZIMBABWEAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS. WE THEREFORE AGREE WITH EMBASSY LONDON THAT IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO BRING OFF THE REFTEL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SOME OF THE FOLLOWERS OF MUGABE AND ZIPA GUERRILLAS WOULD SEE NO REASON TO CONTINUE FIGHTING AND WOULD RE-TURN TO RHODESIA. HOWEVER, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT A SIZEABLE NUMBER OF GUERRILLAS, INCLUDING THE KARANGA HARD CORE, WOULD VIEW A NKOMO/MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT ARRANGED WITHOUT THEIR PARTICIPATION AS A PUTTER GOVERN-MENT AND WOULD CONTINUE TO FIGHT. WE BELIEVE THE GUERRILLAS WOULD RECEIVED THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND MILITARY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT MACHEL, AS WELL AS THAT OF AT LEAST SOME OF THE RADICAL AFRICAN AND THIRD WORLD GOVERNMENTS AND COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE FIGHTING WOULD BE SHORT-LIVED

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OR THAT IT WOULD CONSTITUTE ONLY A NUISANCE TO THE ZIM-
BABWEAN GOVERNMENT. ON THE CONTRARY, THE FIGHTING
WOULD BE BLOODY, PERSISTENT AND EXTENSIIVE. MOREOVER,
THE CHARACTER OF THE FIGHTING WOULD CHANGE FROM WHAT IS
NOW ESSENTIALLY A LIBERATION STRUGGLE, I.E. A FIGHT BE-
TWEEN THE SMITH FORCES AND THE NATIONALISTS, TO THAT OF
A CIVIL OR TRIBAL WAR.

B. SECOND, BECAUSE OF THE ABOVE ESTIMATE, WE BELIEVE
U.S. INTERESTS WOULD BE BETTER SERVED IF WE CONTINUE
OUR CURRENT "HANDS-OFF" POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE
NATIONALIST LEADERSHIP EVEN THOUGH CONTINUATION OF OUR
PRESENT POLICY IS LIKELY TO ENTAIL FURTHER FIGHTING
AND EVENUTALY VICTORY BY THE GUERRILLAS. OUR REASONS
ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1) OUR CURRENT POLICY OF SUPPORTING MAJORITY
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RULE WITHOUT COMMITMENT TO ANY GROUP HAS KEPT US OUT
OF FACTIONAL FIGHTING, SERVED US WELL WITH SOME AFRICAN
LEADERS, AND HAS BEEN FULLY CONSISTENT WITH AMERICAN
PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION. MAINTENANCE OF THIS
POSITION WILL PUT US IN A STRONG POSITION TO CHAMPION
FREE ELECTIONS, WHICH IN OUR JUDGMENT IS THE MOST
EFFECTIVE WAY TO PRECLUDE THE RADICAL FORCES FROM A
DOMINANT ROLE IN AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE.

2) U.S. MANEUVERINGS ON BEHALF OF NKOMO AND MUZOREWA
WILL BE RESENTED BY MANY AFRICANS AND WILL DRAW SHARP
CRITICISM FROM THEM. (WE ASSUME THAT IT WILL NOT BE
POSSIBLE TO KEEP OUR ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF NKOMO
AND MUZOREWA SECRET.) MOREOVER, IF AS WE PREDICT CIVIL
AND TRIBAL STRIFE ENSUES FROM PURSUIT OF REFTEL INITIATE,
THEN U.S. INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL ZIMBABWEAN POLITICS
WILL LAY US OPEN TO BLAME, AMONG OTHER THINGS, FOR HAVING
SOWN DISSENSION AMONG THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONALIST MOVE-
MENTS, FOR HAVING PROVIDED CIVIL AND TRIBAL FIGHTING,
AND FOR HAVING DIVIDED THE OAU. THESE CHARGES WILL BE
WIDELY BELIEVED AND WILL SERIOUSLY DAMAGE OUR
BILATERAL RELATIONS IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES.

3) U.S. INTERVENTION IN ZIMBABWEAN PARTISAN
POLITICS WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO COUNTER
OR CHALLENGE COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.
THE COMMUNISTS WILL PROBABLY STEP-UP THEIR SUPPORT
FOR THE GUERRILLAS REGARDLESS OF WHAT WE DO, BUT
THEY ARE ALMOST CERTAIN TO FIND THEIR INFLUENCE AND
OPPORTUNITIES ENHANCED IT THEY CAN PRETEND TO BE ACTING
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INCLUDING MOZAMBIQUE, ARE MORE LIKEELY TO OFFER THE SOVIETS
MILITARY FACILITIES OR PERMIT THEM MORE OPERATION
LIBERTIES IF WE TRY TO ESTABLISH WHAT IN THEIR EYES WILL
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POWER RIVALRY OUT OF AFRICA HAS THE SUPPORT OF MANY
AFRICAN LEADERS; FUTURE APPEALS TO THIS END WOULD HAVE
A HOLLOW RING IF WE ENGAGE IN PARTISAN POLITICS IN
RHOESIAN AS ACTIVELY AS RECOMMENDED IN REFTEL.

4) FINALLY, WE DO NOT BELIEVE U.S. BILATERAL
RELATIONS WITH AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE NOR U.S.
REGIONAL INTERESTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WILL BE THAT MUCH
MORE ADVERSELY AFFECTED IF RADICAL LEADERS ASSUME
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BOTH NKOMO AND MUGABE WOULD ADOPT A MILITANT PRO-
LIBERATION STANCE.

4. IN CONCLUSION, WE URGE THAT THE USG WEIGHT CARE-
FULLY THE PROS AND CONS BEFORE DEPARTING FROM OUR
PRESENT "HAND-OFF" POLICY. THIS POSITION HAS BEEN
ONE OF THE STRENGTHS OF THE U.S./UK NEGOTIATING
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LEADERS. DE PREE UNQTE VANCE

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S E C R E T STATE 027871

NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG

FOLLOWING SECSTATE 27871 SENT ACTION LAGOS USUN NEW YORK
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S E C R E T STATE 027871

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FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG-LAGOS

FOLLOWING REPEAT MAPUTO 118 ACTION SECSTATE DTD 07 FEB

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, RH
SUBJECT: SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON RHODESIA

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WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NEITHER THE PATRIOTIC FRONT NOR

ZIPA IS A COHESIVE BODY: THEY ARE AS DIVIDED ON TRIBAL
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TURN TO RHODESIA. HOWEVER, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT A SIZEABLE NUMBER OF GUERRILLAS, INCLUDING THE KARANGA HARD CORE, WOULD VIEW A NKOMO/MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT ARRANGED WITHOUT THEIR PARTICIPATION AS A PUTTER GOVERNMENT AND WOULD CONTINUE TO FIGHT. WE BELIEVE THE GUERRILLAS WOULD RECEIVED THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND MILITARY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT MACHEL, AS WELL AS THAT OF AT LEAST SOME OF THE RADICAL AFRICAN AND THIRD WORLD GOVERNMENTS AND COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

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B. SECOND, BECAUSE OF THE ABOVE ESTIMATE, WE BELIEVE U.S. INTERESTS WOULD BE BETTER SERVED IF WE CONTINUE OUR CURRENT "HANDS-OFF" POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE NATIONALIST LEADERSHIP EVEN THOUGH CONTINUATION OF OUR PRESENT POLICY IS LIKELY TO ENTAIL FURTHER FIGHTING AND EVENUTALY VICTORY BY THE GUERRILLAS. OUR REASONS

ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1) OUR CURRENT POLICY OF SUPPORTING MAJORITY RULE WITHOUT COMMITMENT TO ANY GROUP HAS KEPT US OUT OF FACTIONAL FIGHTING, SERVED US WELL WITH SOME AFRICAN LEADERS, AND HAS BEEN FULLY CONSISTENT WITH AMERICAN PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION. MAINTENANCE OF THIS POSITION WILL PUT US IN A STRONG POSITION TO CHAMPION FREE ELECTIONS, WHICH IN OUR JUDGMENT IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO PRECLUDE THE RADICAL FORCES FROM A DOMINANT ROLE IN AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE.

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Sent Date: 08-Feb-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
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Disposition Approved on Date:
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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Reference: 77 LONDON 1792
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Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
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Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON RHODESIA SECRET SECRET
TAGS: PFOR, PDEV, US, RH, UK, ZIPA
To: LAGOS USUN NEW YORK MULTIPLE
Type: TE
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